There is a prevailing assumption within Western cultures of a dichotomy, where mind and matter refer to fundamentally different (or ontologically distinct) kinds of phenomenon that work according to different principles or laws. On the one hand there is the world of Matter - that constitutes the realm of physical phenomena and that behaves according to the Laws of Physics (e.g., Laws of Motion, Laws of Thermodynamics, etc.). On the other hand is the world of Mind that constitutes the realm of mental phenomena and that behaves according to a completely different set of laws or principles (e.g., psychological or information processing principles).
This is sometimes referred to as the Mind/Body problem - suggesting that our bodies are subject to the Laws of Physics, but that our Minds are subject to different laws related to psychology or information. In essence, we have a world of hardware and a world of software and that these two worlds are fundamentally different, operating according to different laws/principles, and requiring separate sciences.
However, this belief is not universal, and it has been rejected by some notable philosophers/scientists (e.g., William James). James conceived of experience as a unified whole that included both physical (objective) and mental (subjective) constraints.
Just so, I maintain, does a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of 'consciousness'; while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content.' In a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing. And, since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective, both at once. (James 1912, Essay I)
Further James argued for a single, unified science that focused on the relations that constituted the totality of experience resulting from the combined impact of the physical and the mental constraints. In our book, "A Meaning Processing Approach to Cognition" Fred Voorhorst and I make the case that there are three duals that are fundamental to a unified science of experience. Each dual reflects specific relations between mental (subjective) and physical (objective) constraints.
The first dual is a concept introduced by James Gibson that has gained increased acceptance from the design community. This is the construct of affordance or affording. An affordance reflects the potential for action that reflects properties of an agent in relation to properties of objects. The prototypical example is the affordance of graspability that reflects the relation between an agents effectors (e.g., hands) and the size, orientation, and shape of objects. Another example of an affordance that reflects the agency of a human-technology system is land-ability. This reflects the properties of a surface relative to the capabilities of an aircraft. Different aircraft (fixed wing versus rotary wing) are capable of landing successfully on different types of surfaces. In control theoretic terms, affordance is closely related to the concept of controllability - reflecting the joint constraints of the agent and the situation on acting.
The second dual is a concept that is related to James Gibson's concept of information (e.g., the optical array) and that was the focus of Eleanor Gibson's research on perceptual learning and attunement. We refer to this dual as specificity or specifying. This refers to the relation between the sensory/perceptual capabilities or perspicacity of an agent and the structure available in the physical medium (e.g., the light, acoustics, tactile properties, or the properties of a graphical interface). For example, due to the angular projection of light, the motions of an observer relative to the surfaces in the environment are well specified in the optical array (e.g., the imminence of collision, or the angle of approach to a runway). In control theoretic terms, specificity is closely related to the construct of observability - reflecting the quality of the feedback with respect to specifying the states of a process being controlled. E.J. Gibson's work on perceptual learning reflects the insight that it typically takes experience for organisms to discover and attend to those structures in the medium that are discriminating or diagnostic with respect to different functions or intentions. For example, pilots must learn to pick up the optical features that specify a safe approach to landing.
The third dual is a concept that James Gibson included in his definition of affordance, that we feel is better isolated as a third dual. We refer to this dual as satisfaction or satisfying. This refers to the relation between the consequences of an action and the intentions/desires or health of an actor. If the consequences are consistent with the desires of an actor or if they are healthy, then the relation is satisfying. If the consequences are counter to the desires or unhealthy then they are unsatisfying. For example, a food that is healthy or a safe aircraft landing would be satisfying. But a food that was poisonous or a crash landing would be unsatisfying. In control theoretic terms, satisfaction is closely related to the cost function that might be used to determine the quality or optimality of a control solution. In essence, the satisfying dimension reflects the quality of outcomes.
We see these three duals as essential properties of any control system or sensemaking organization. That is, the quality of control, skill, situation awareness, or of sensemaking will depend on whether the affordances (action capabilities) and potential consequences are well specified by the available feedback, which in turn should enable the development of quality (if not optimal) control/decision making that reduces surprises and risks, and increases the potential for satisfying outcomes.
Here's a fourth! Metaffordance. I know you'll love it 🙂
Can't say "metaffording" though 🙁
I do believe the world is full of things now that don't just allow us to act but instead, they act back...they inter-act.
There's also the semantic doble entendre of course which is satisfying to me...some say all thought is about analogy and metaphor (e.g., Hofstadter). I know you like the verb, and not another noun, but here you have it:
https://metaffordance.com/affordances
Follow-up, second comment (first had no reply!):
So you are extending the simple perception-action concept to perception-action-consequences.
Is the satisfaction component not implicit in the P-A framework? It's always depicted as a cycle with the feedback arrows labelled "information". Your jigsaw static metaphor is a solid visual metaphor. Does not have flow implied or even needed? Is there another visualization that shows flow? I'm guessing it's in your chapters somewhere?
Skilled muddling: Yes, we could all try better with our muddles and becoming more skilled. Gibson might even approve!
Where do you discuss in detail (chapter?) why you dislike the noun form and prefer -ing, as a participle and/or a gerund form of the noun (e.g., affording instead of affordance; informing instead of information). Some thing is informing...some thing is affording. What is that thing?
Picking up my earlier comment: I've been thinking about why metaffordance might earn its place as a fourth dual rather than just a variant of affording!
Affording, specifying, and satisfying are each a relation given at a moment of coupling, agent-capability with environment-property, sensory information with environmental structure, action-consequence with intention. What they share, and what makes them duals rather than dichotomies, is that the relation is primary and directly given, not glued together afterward from two separate substances. That's actually James's move in radical empiricism, stated precisely: relations, the felt "and" between things, are as directly experienced as the things themselves, not supplied later by an interpreting mind. Gibson's direct perception is that thesis applied to perception, which is presumably why affording and specifying map onto it so cleanly, and satisfying pushes it further, into meaning and purpose, which is closer to James's actual target than Gibson usually goes.
Metaffordance, I think, is what you get when that same relation is iterated rather than momentary: not just a fixed possibility for action, but a coupling that updates in response to being acted on, so the relation itself becomes something you can stand in a further relation to. A pencil, a phone, an AI system, they don't just afford, they keep the "and then, and then" of the interaction going. That's the same continuity James was pointing at with the stream of consciousness, and it's the same thing that shows up when cognition gets modeled as continuous process rather than discrete stages, just externalized into the artifact instead of left inside the organism.
I'd stop short of claiming this borrows James's full metaphysics, the neutral "pure experience" underneath mental and physical. It's the relational, functionalist spirit of radical empiricism, inherited by way of Gibson, put to applied use. I'm sure you'd rather leave it off your framework and that's fine but I think it holds!