Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality
In his second book Lila, Pirsig tells an anecdote about a Native American Indian who responds to a question about the type of a particular dog with the answer "That's a good dog." The questioner laughs at this response, as if the question was not understood. But Pirsig notes that for Native American's "good" is a quality of the dog that can be directly experienced. That is, "good" is not a subjective interpretation, an opinion of the observer, but an ontologically basic property of the experience. In other words, "good" is a property that can be directly perceived.
This is an aspect of the dynamics of circles that is not well appreciated - in addition to affording and specifying - satisfying is fundamental to the dynamics of abduction or adaptive control.
In the classical Western view, properties such as 'goodness' are subjective or derivative. As such, they fall outside of the sphere of science and are relegated to the arts. In pursuit of objectivity, Western science has defined all questions associated with value as irrelevant or extrinsic to its mission to understand reality. The implication is that value is not real. It is not an ontological primitive. It is a derivative property that is open to interpretation.
However, the stability of a system that is intimately coupled with an ecology depends critically on the ability to discriminate between the 'good' (e.g., nutritious, safe, growth enhancing) and the 'bad' (e.g., poisonous, threatening, stifling). Thus, the implication of Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality is that for the dynamics of experience - qualities such as good and bad are ontologically basic. Much more so than the objective properties of Western Science (e.g., position, velocity, size, weight).
The objective properties of Western Science were specifically chosen to describe a reality that was independent from an observer. However, a science of experience is interested specifically in the properties that relate to stability of the coupling between perception and action (or the coupling between the actor and the ecology). These properties include constraints on action (affording), constraints on perception (specifying), and constraints on value (satisfying). Each specified as duals that depend jointly on properties of the relations between actor and ecology.
It is the constraints on value (satisfying) that determine the attractive potential of the field of experience -- whereas the constraints on action and perception will determine what attractors can be realized and what repellers can be avoided. In other words, the constraints on value determine the relations between the ecology and the health of the actor (e.g., consequences). And the constraints on information and action determine the capacity of the actor to discriminate and control action to realize the healthy consequences and avoid the dangerous consequences.
The key point of the Metaphysics of Quality is that the constraints on value (i.e., what is good and bad; healthy or dangerous) are as ontologically basic to experience as the constraints on action and information. These three types of constraint jointly shape motion through the field of experience.
In relation to the previous post - emotions may be that aspect of experience that reflects attunement to properties associated with value. Falling in love is an example of detecting an attractor. For example, we fall in love with an object (e.g., a house, a car, another person) and then the constraints on perception and action determine whether the object can be obtained or not. A person without emotions is like a boat without a destination - adrift on the seas, fully functional (i.e., controllable) but with no reference for preferring one direction to another.
What about FLAC?!
What about CDs versus LPs? How do you explain this in terms of QUALITY and your perspective?! Many now are moving *back*(or for first time!) to vinyl!! I find it hilarious! Reply on your blog somewhere if you like, so I know how to get in and navigate it. Please post link here.
CDs are "better" audio (NO scratches, snap, crackle, or pop; LPs may be for some "better" as they are touchy-feely-scratchy haptic experiences plus memory/nostalgia and more, with clearer more meaningfully designed artwork etc. Discuss...(not just "analog is infinite, digital isn't" argument - the ear and mind, has JND limits. Surely. 320 MP3 is just fine!! Or am I going deaf? And...digital is often 4 free!! And what about your namesake, Flac?! Or Neil Young's hidef format etc).
This example may be a good test of your theory of quality...? What is the SOURCE of quality?! Those who have ears will hear...
Anthony, I have to admit that I didn't know what FLAC was! Thanks for bringing this to my attention. The essence of your question is how can we explain individual differences in experience. For example, if one person (raised in Florida) walks outside and says, "It's cold." And a second person (raised in Northern Canada) replies, "No, this is not cold at all!" Who is right?
Or consider the waterbath experiment - where the hand from the cold bucket feels as if the tepid water is warm and the hand from the warm bucket feels as if the tepid water is cool. Which is correct?
An additional context to consider is signal detection. Where is the optimal (or at least satisfying) placement of the decision criterion (Beta)? The answer is that it depends on the payoff matrix or the value system.
In these examples, I would argue that "context" matters. This context includes past experiences (e.g., the initial bucket, prior music experience) and a value system (e.g., the payoff matrix; differential aesthetic tastes).
Thus, this is where I would look for explanations of individual differences in judgments about quality - in prior experiences or in differential value systems. Quality emerges from the triadic semiotic dynamic.
Who is Anthony??? It was posted by PJT.
The music example deserves further consideration. FLAC (lossless) vs. MP3 (lossy) vs. new lossless formats (eg, Neil Young's) address explicitly the issue of music "quality". It seems to deteriorate into an issue of subjectivity when one person prefers vinyl over digital when the vinyl is objectively worse in terms of scratches but arguably better in terms of audio dynamic range. But can humans hear it? Some can maybe. But it's mostly fashion, trendiness, and prejudice that makes some favor vinyl. It seems "quality" is not about individual differences but something more essential. Pirsig certainly did not consider "quality" a mere matter of personal opinion. When he cut a tin can on the fly to fashion a shim to repair a loose attachment on his bike, that was not a matter of opinion...or of individual differences. My example of objective quality in music indicates an objective role for definitions or discourse on quality.
From an ecological information perspective, audio quality is objective (information) and has nothing to do with opinion. It exists if it is listened to or not...like an affordance. But what is "listening"? Does it involve the hands fondling an album cover...or memory?? Are you accepting memory-based perception?! I though you had elevated "quality" to a higher standard than mere opinion and individual differences, memories, dreams, and reflections...
Oops! Sorry I meant Paul. Quality is not a "mere" matter of personal opinion. But neither is it a property of the recording (FLAC, MP3, or vinyl) or the shim.
In our framework, quality is a property of experience. Thus, it emerges as a result of the affording, specifying, satisfying dynamic. For example, the quality of the shim is not (in the shim), but rather in the "fit" of the shim in satisfying the repair function. In the same way, 'graspability' is not in the cup - only in the relation between the cup and a particular effector. If the function requires the cleanest sound (minimal noise or distortion) then the digital formats may have the best "fit to the function" or "quality." But if a person is not an audiophile and the function that they are satisfying is to "make a fashion statement" or to experience the music as it was experienced originally by previous generations, then vinyl may be a better fit.
I particularly disagree with your statement that "audio quality" is "objective." This suggests that it has a reality independent of experience. We see this "objective" property as being derivative - not basic. Yes we can derive an "objective measure" using the audio engineer's bench, but this is no more real than the feeling of satisfaction that someone might experience listening to a vinyl record with their parents as the parents reminisce over the first time they heard the album. We would argue that the dichotomy between objective versus subjective is false. Reality is both subjective and objective.
Paul. Here are quotes from Gibson (1979) that might be relevant to this discussion:
In our framework we take this to heart and extend it beyond affordance. We would say exactly the same thing about experience.
Experience (and the quality there of) is a joint function of agent and ecology as reflected in the dynamics of affording, specifying, and satisfying.
Further, we make the claim along with William James (and Pirsig) that experience is the most ontologically basic form of reality (i.e., the idea of mind and matter as independent are derivative from this basic reality - not the other way around). Similarly, the objective-subjective distinction is false - since no aspect of experience is "merely subjective" or "merely objective." The quality of experience is always a joint function of the constraints on action (affording), the constraints on information (specifying), and the constraints on value (satisfying) Hope this makes sense!
The quote from Gibson is close to my bones, of course, but it is, as Gibson might admit today, "muddled"...and inadequate...must try harder?! viz. "An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and HELPS to understand its inadequacy." But, I think, from where we stand now, 40 years after this was written, with all the empirical research on affordances (their perception and action upon them) and on Gibsonian specificational information, and theoretical debate, there is something profoundly missing in the story. Perhaps a radically new story is needed. Indeed, it is conceptually no different now from the radical empiricism of 100 years ago and James's thought...it was and has been the best there is, now more carefully described. But it is inadequate as it does not address the elephant in the room. The deeper issue of consciousness reaches beyond mere pragmatic functionalist instrumentalist "explanation". What is experience beyond an emergent property or the causal result of some triadic cycle? What is doing the experiencing? Where is it? Why is it? Poetic conundrums, as per the famous Gibson quote, doesn't cut it. And Pirsig's analytical knife was not sharp enough if I remember the book...Yes, experience is fundamental but one need not be satisfied and stop there in the exploration; perhaps it is not Fundamental, only fundamental.
Consciousness may be Fundamental. If it is, then all things are consciousness. Everything. Awareness is not an emergent property. It is primary. If this is the case, then your scheme is somewhat redundant. Experience does not "emerge" from circular causality between interacting components of informing (but how?), affording (but why?), satisfying (but who?), although that is a reasonable framework. Although you say "we make the claim along with William James (and Pirsig) that experience is the most ontologically basic form of reality" it begs the question!
Our recent book What Matters? is our attempt to extend Gibson - and to make the links between affordances (our affording/action constraints); ecological optics (our specifying/information constraints); and valence (our satisfying/value constraints) more explicit - reflecting the closed-loop dynamics of self-organization. Also, our goal was to make the practical implications for experience-centered design more explicit. Obviously, you are not satisfied with our efforts. But as we note at the end of the book - it's a big mountain and we are probably a long way from the top. We don't claim to have all the answers to the problem of consciousness -- but hopefully this is a small step in a productive direction and our musings will inspire you and others to look even further. [Link to free pdf of the book can be found in the menu bar on the right side of this blog].
No, not dissatisfied...it's a nice book and effort, what I have seen of it. Congrats! I realise it is aimed at the UX HCI community, and penned from that viewpoint. But I am pushing for a recognition of the deeper issue, given your mention of Quality - a deep and central issue!! Your book would be a good introduction to those not yet familiar with the coherence and depth of the ecological design approach, and as I am experiencing, a good touchstone for re-consideration for those already having appreciation and understanding of ecological psychology as do I. All fine and well. My concern is deeply at the heart of Pirsig's quest, and that of all mystics: the nature of the source.
Thanks for the kind words about the book. We are wrestling with exactly the issues you raise - and hope that others (in addition to the UX community) will
benefit from engaging with the book. The concerns you raise do not cause me to question our Metaphysics -- but again, I have not given much thought to these much more complex aspects of experience. My focus is in exploring skill and expertise in domains such as aviation and healthcare.
The issue of the illusory subjective/objective dichotomy is well-illustrated in this powerful TED talk and description of the experience of consciousness without normal, terrestrial perception. The speaker, a neuroscientist, had a stroke. Crucially, is identical in description to the mystical experiences facilitated by ingestion of entheogens - sacred plants that have been valued for millenia - probably because they provide insight beyond the terrestrial realm of affordances and survival. WHAT IS THIS?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entheogen
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyyjU8fzEYU
Nice video. I am familiar with the story (phenomenon). I don't claim to have a comprehensive explanation of the experiences described, but there is nothing in the video that undermines my confidence in our framework. That is, I believe that the experiences described (and other such experiences associated with drugs) are not inconsistent with our framework. In our chapter on social dynamics (CH 14) we make the case that "experience" is not necessarily a property of individuals -- and we talk about experience and sensemaking in an organizational context. I think this might be extrapolated to cultures and worlds (e.g. GAIA as you suggested in other discussions). But that is an extrapolation that we have not even begun to work out.
I see GAIA not as an external world to have a framework encompass. GAIA *IS* the framework!
We humans, animals, plants are *in* Gaia. Gaia is not merely a complex system of self-regulating physical ecosystems; Gaia *is* organized consciousness in this corner of the Milky Way galaxy. We are in her. This changes the value system of Quality and what it is dramatically.
Edit: In her and constitutive of her, but not identical to her. This is GNOSIS.
I interpret GAIA as the idea that consciousness is universal or collective, rather than individual. I believe this is consistent with a monist ontology that makes the assumption that the realities of mind and matter are founded within a single, unitary ontology (i.e., experience, consciousness, or GAIA involves both mind and matter; is neither subjective or objective).
ps.
How do I edit a comment?
How make italics?
Is there a help/format box for this blog site?
Not sure. I have a control bar when I enter replies to comments that allows me to bold, italicize, and create quote blocks. But I don't know what is available to people who are commenting. One of the reasons I find HCI interesting is due to my own ineptness with the technologies. I will see what I can learn.
Interesting discussion...in an effort to re-mind myself, I found this as one of the first links on a Pirsig web search. It's by a certain 'Andrew'(!):
http://www.moq.org/forum/mcwatt/anthony.html
"Quality can't be defined as such and that true understanding of it can only be given through a mystic experience such as enlightenment." From:
"7. So how is Dynamic Quality differentiated from static quality?
Dynamic Quality is the term given by Pirsig to the continually changing flux of immediate reality while static quality refers to any concept abstracted from this flux. Pirsig equates Dynamic Quality with F.S.C. Northrop's "indeterminate aesthetic continuum" which refers to the divine in experience and can only be understood properly through direct apprehension. Hence the use of the term "dynamic" which indicates something not fixed or determinate. Ultimately, it is apparent that Dynamic Quality can't be defined as such and that true understanding of it can only be given through a mystic experience such as enlightenment. "
I think this confirms my point that Quality is more than an emergent property; it has a pre-existing aspect...which implores exploring how/where/why so.
Not sure what Pirsig intended or what others who follow him mean by "quality." I guess I simply mean that quality = experience. By using the word quality I simply intended to communicate that value (e.g., goodness) is part of the dynamic. I agree with Gibson that it is important to differentiate between affordance and valence. But I believe that it is a mistake to ignore valence. We have to understand why people are attracted to things (e.g., fall in love with an object or person). This is why we add the dimension of satisfying to the dynamic of experience (along with affording and specifying - that are similar, but not isomorphic with Gibson's affordance and ecological optics.)
How do you differentiate affordance and valance?
Gibson writes:
We use the term "affording" and the concept differs from Gibson in two ways.
1) First, we do not consider it a property of the environment, but rather a property of the complete triadic semiotic dynamic. It is a property of experience.
2) Second, we eliminate the "for good or ill" and use affording simply to reflect the constraints on action (i.e., what is doable)
We introduce the construct of 'satisfying' to address the issue of "good or ill." That is, satisfying refers to the constraints on value or the consequences of an action in terms of its value in achieving some function (e.g., survival, success). For example, the payoff matrix in signal detection would be one way to operationalize a satisfying constraint.
From a control theoretic perspective it is useful to differentiate the constraints on action (e.g., the laws of motion) from the criteria for success (e.g., the cost function or payoff matrix). The third important dimension from control theory would be the nature of feedback in terms of the "state variables." This is where the construct of 'specifying' comes in - reflecting the constraint on information (e.g., feedback).
So, we think that the construct of valence as originally used, confounds action, information, and value constraints.
We think Gibson's construct of affordance confounds action and value constraints. But Gibson did a good job of separating out 'information constraints.'
But we agree that the qualities reflected in terms like valence and affordances are the ontological foundation for experience. For example, we think that experience reflects the direct interaction with constraints on action, information, and value. To be more concrete we believe that animals directly perceive the imminence and potential consequences of collision, rather than space. "Space" as reflected in physical sciences is derivative. However, the potential of collision is ontologically fundamental.
This is addressed in CH 4 of our book What Matters?
Yes, Chapter 4 is interesting as it attempts to draw a distinction between modern ecological psychology (the dynamical systems neoGibsonian school aka Connecticut tradition), and yours.
The reference to pilots' "good situational awareness" is well-illustrated in SULLY. Did you write about this wonderful movie?
The first half hour of Turvey's recent lecture already addresses several of your key issues...nature of perception, abduction, experience...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X83iNQJzPNI&index=3&list=PLtoX6L88vjkcxn7KEyY_NJKmqOTw5EakG
I was at Turvey's presentation in Minnesota. I think there are significant gaps between how Mike and I see things. I would be very interested to know whether Mike
has looked at our book, and to get his reaction. But in the past, he has tended to dismiss our work as merely "applied."
You might need to alert him to it/send it.
erican's "good" is a quality of the dog that can be directly experienced. That is, "good" is not a subjective interpretation, an opinion of the observer, but an ontologically basic property of the experience. In other words, "good" is a property that can be directly perceived.